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Gibbs states are familiar from statistical mechanics, yet their use is not limited to that domain.
For instance, they also feature in the maximum entropy reconstruction of quantum states from
incomplete measurement data. Outside the macroscopic realm, however, estimating a Gibbs state
is a nontrivial inference task, due to two complicating factors: the proper set of relevant observables
might not be evident a priori; and whenever data are gathered from a small sample only, the best
estimate for the Lagrange parameters is invariably affected by the experimenter’s prior bias. I
show how the two issues can be tackled with the help of Bayesian model selection and Bayesian
interpolation, respectively, and illustrate the use of these Bayesian techniques with a number of
simple examples.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Wj, 02.50.Cw, 02.50.Tt, 05.30.Ch
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum states are not accessible to direct observa-
tion, and so do not constitute per se a physical reality.
Rather, they provide a convenient mathematical sum-
mary of an agent’s expectations as to the outcomes of
future experiments [1]. Such expectations are formed
both on the basis of past measurement data and on the
basis of any prior knowledge (say, about specific symme-
tries) that the agent may have. In practice, the available
experimental data are often far from perfect: measure-
ment devices work with limited accuracy; sample sizes
are finite; and the set of observables measured might not
be informationally complete. Under such circumstances,
a quantum state represents merely a model, and hence a
hypothesis, which is subject to testing, debate, and mod-
ification. The more complex the physical system under
study, and the sketchier the available data, the more this
model will be informed by the agent’s prior knowledge.
Prior knowledge may be of two types: (i) the expecta-
tion, often based on symmetry considerations, that the
quantum state has a certain parametric form; and (ii)
given a parametric form (including free-form as a spe-
cial case), a bias as to its parameter values. Making
proper use of such prior knowledge can lead to signif-
icant gains in the efficiency and accuracy of quantum-
state tomography, i.e., the reconstruction of a quantum
state from imperfect data. One recent example where
prior knowledge about the parametric form has been ex-
ploited to great advantage, is the polynomial scheme for
reconstructing near matrix product states [2]. The sec-
ond type of prior knowledge, on the other hand, has been
used in recent Bayesian modifications to the conventional
maximum likelihood tomography scheme [3–5].
One parametric form that occupies a special place in
physics is that of a Gibbs state. Such a state maxi-
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mizes the entropy, or more generally, minimizes the rel-
ative entropy with respect to some reference state, un-
der given constraints on some selected set of expecta-
tion values. Gibbs states are familiar from statistical
mechanics where, in both the classical [6, 7] and the
quantum [8] case, the principle of maximum entropy has
long been recognised as the appropriate prescription for
constructing the macrostate. The common justification
of this principle rests on a number of assumptions: (i)
the system under consideration may be viewed as one
constituent of a larger ensemble of identically prepared
systems, whose size approaches infinity (the “thermody-
namic limit”); (ii) pertaining to the global state of this
fictitious infinite ensemble, there are constraints in the
form of sharp values for the totals of certain observables
deemed relevant; and (iii) there is clarity as to which ob-
servables are relevant. While the first two assumptions
are of a purely statistical nature, the last implicitly in-
vokes the system’s dynamics. In equilibrium statistical
mechanics, the relevant observables are the system’s con-
stants of the motion; whereas in nonequilibrium trans-
port equations, they typically comprise the slowly vary-
ing degrees of freedom [9].
Gibbs states play an important role even in realms
where the above assumptions are not justified. For
instance, hadronization in e+e− collisions is described
with thermal distributions, even though the number of
hadrons produced in one collision is hardly more than a
handful [10]. Another example is the extension of ther-
modynamics to nanoscale quantum systems, and in par-
ticular, to the study of work extraction from such finite
systems [11–14]. And finally, in incomplete quantum-
state tomography, Gibbs models feature in the recon-
struction schemes based on maximum entropy [15–18], or
in case there is an initial bias towards some non-uniform
reference state, on the principle of minimum relative en-
tropy [19]. In all these examples, the measurement data,
and hence any derived constraints, do not pertain to
(quasi) infinite ensembles but to real samples which are
small; and the systems are often too simple to exhibit
2a clear hierarchy of time scales that would lead to an
obvious choice for the relevant observables.
When prior knowledge suggests that a small physical
system is well described by a Gibbs state, yet the proper
set of relevant observables is not evident a priori, the
choice of the latter becomes a matter of statistical infer-
ence. Competing theories might propose different sets of
relevant observables; and the task is then to decide ratio-
nally between them on the basis of rather sketchy data.
Typically, this inference task involves a trade-off between
goodness-of-fit on the one hand, favoring a large num-
ber of relevant observables; and simplicity on the other
(“Occam’s razor”), favoring a number that is as small as
possible. The appropriate framework for deciding such
a trade-off is Bayesian model selection [20]. Adapting
this framework to the task of finding the optimal set of
relevant observables in a Gibbs model, be it classical or
quantum, is one central objective of the present paper.
Given the set of relevant observables, the next infer-
ence task is the estimation of the associated Lagrange
parameters. Whenever the sample size is small, the esti-
mate must take into account not only experimental data
but also prior expectations. The fact that the prior bias
invariably exerts an influence on the parameter estimate,
is readily seen in a trivial example: If five tosses of a coin
yield “heads” five times, one is not yet ready to aban-
don one’s prior bias towards a more or less fair coin; only
as evidence to the contrary accumulates, does this be-
lief gradually erode. The challenge, then, is to find the
relative weights to be attributed to prior bias and data.
Again, the appropriate tools are furnished by Bayesian
theory, namely Bayesian interpolation [21] in combina-
tion with the evidence procedure [5]. Putting these tools
to use for the estimation of Lagrange parameters in a
Gibbs model, is the second main objective of the present
paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. II, I will
start with some preliminaries about the χ2 distribution,
the entropy concentration theorem, and the concept of
statistical significance, which will be needed in subse-
quent arguments. Then I shall turn to the two inference
problems outlined above, albeit in reverse order. In Sec.
III, I will assume that the relevant observables of a Gibbs
model are given, and show how its Lagrange parameters
can be estimated in a way that accounts for both prior
knowledge and measured data. The estimation proce-
dure will yield not just the optimal values for the La-
grange parameters, but also the associated error bars. In
Sec. IV, I shall consider the issue of the proper set of rele-
vant observables, and show that Bayesian model selection
provides a rational framework for choosing between rival
proposals. I will illustrate this method with two exam-
ples, the classical analysis of Wolf’s die (Sec. V) and
the quantum problem of deciding between an Ising and
a Heisenberg description of an assembly of qubits (Sec.
VI). In Sec. VII, I shall conclude with a brief summary.
There are a number of appendices in which I collect
technical definitions and results that might not be famil-
iar to readers of this journal, yet whose inclusion in the
main body of the text would render the flow of exposition
unnecessarily cumbersome. Specifically, in Appendix A,
I shall introduce the notion of a level of description; in
Appendix B, the notions of coarse graining, relevant part
of a state, and generalised Gibbs states; and in Appendix
C, the definition and basic geometry of a Gibbs manifold,
which includes as a special case (discussed in Appendix
D) the geometry of the Bloch sphere. In Appendix E,
I will introduce the concept of an entropic distribution
on the Gibbs manifold; and in Appendix F, I will con-
sider the meaning of the Gaussian approximation and
of the thermodynamic limit. Finally, in Appendix G, I
shall connect the general framework of Gibbs models to
the familiar terminology and basic relations of thermo-
dynamics.
II. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
In a generic experiment, some selected set of observ-
ables, spanning the experimental level of description F ,
is measured on N identically prepared copies of a phys-
ical system, yielding sample means f . Given a reference
state σ, these experimental data can be represented as a
Gibbs model µ ∈ πσF (S), with Lagrange parameters ad-
justed such as to reproduce the observed sample means,
f(µ) = f . The correspondence f ↔ µ is one-to-one.
On the same Gibbs manifold, let ρ denote a theoretical
model yielding expectation values f(ρ); these generally
differ from the observed sample means. As long as the
difference is small, the relative entropy between data and
theoretical model is approximately quadratic in the dif-
ferentials δf . According to Eq. (C9), it is
2NS(µ‖ρ) ≈ χ2(µ‖ρ), (1)
with
χ2(µ‖ρ) := N
∑
ab
(C−1)abδfaδfb. (2)
For definitions of further mathematical objects used here
(F , πσF (S), C−1), see Appendices A through C.
Since the theoretical model may contain parameters
that have been fitted to the data, the differentials δf
might not be all independent; the number k of indepen-
dent differentials is generally smaller than the dimension
of the Gibbs manifold. Given a (possibly fitted) theo-
retical model, the likelihood that the k remaining inde-
pendent degrees of freedom yield some χ2 in the interval
[x, x + dx] is determined for large N by the probability
density function
pdf(x|k) = 2−k/2Γ(k/2)−1xk/2−1 exp(−x/2), (3)
known as the χ2 distribution [22]. In this distribution,
the exponential factor stems from the quantum Stein
lemma (B4); the power factor from the k-dimensional
volume element; and the numerical factors ensure proper
3normalisation. The χ2 distribution is peaked at χ2max =
k−2 (for k > 2), and has expectation value and variance
〈χ2〉 = k , var(χ2) = 2k, (4)
respectively. For large arguments (x ≫ k ln k) it has an
exponential tail independent of k,
pdf(x|k) ∼ exp(−x/2). (5)
The above distribution of χ2, and hence of relative
entropy, implies the entropy concentration theorem [23]:
As the sample size N increases, the relative entropy be-
tween data and theoretical model is predicted to be-
come more and more concentrated (with a width of or-
der 1/N) around a smaller and smaller expectation value
(also of order 1/N). Relative entropy being approxi-
mately quadratic in the coordinate differentials δf , this
implies as an immediate corollary that deviations be-
tween measured sample means and theoretical expecta-
tion values are expected to scale as O(1/
√
N). The en-
tropy concentration theorem can thus be employed to
assess quickly the statistical significance of experimental
deviations from theoretical predictions: As long as the
relative entropy between data and theoretical model is
of the order 1/N , deviations likely fall within the range
of statistical fluctuations; yet as soon as their relative
entropy exceeds this limit, deviations become significant
and may indicate the need to revise the theoretical model.
This simple entropy test is closely related to the χ2 test in
conventional statistics. Theoretical models are typically
rejected whenever at the observed χ2 the cumulative dis-
tribution function exceeds some predefined bound, whose
value in turn depends on the confidence level required.
The χ2 test then points to the need to revise a given the-
oretical model, and may trigger creative thinking about
possible alternatives.
III. ESTIMATING LAGRANGE PARAMETERS
I consider the situation where it is assumed from the
outset that a physical system is to be described by some
Gibbs model ω ∈ πσG(S), with given reference state σ
and level of description G, yet unknown parameter val-
ues. The initial uncertainty about the parameter values is
reflected in a prior probability distribution prob(ω|σ,G)
over the Gibbs manifold. Subsequently, on a sample of
size N , one measures some set of sample means f . The
associated experimental level of description F may or
may not coincide with the theoretical level of description
G. In the light of the observed sample means and the
prior distribution over the Gibbs manifold, one wants to
infer the most plausible estimate for ω.
After collecting the experimental data, the probability
distribution over the Gibbs manifold must be updated
according to the Bayes rule [24]
prob(ω|f,N,F ;σ,G) ∝ prob(f |N,ω,F) prob(ω|σ,G).
(6)
The first factor on the right hand side is the likelihood of
observing the sample means f , given ω; it is
prob(f |N,ω,F) ∝
∫
S|f
dρ prob(ρ|N,ω), (7)
with the integration ranging over the submanifold S|f
of all states that satisfy the constraints f(ρ) = f , and
normalised according to Eq. (C10),∫ ∏
b
dfb
√
detC−1prob(f |N,ω,F) = 1. (8)
For large N , by virtue of the quantum Stein lemma (B4)
and the law of Pythagoras (F6), the likelihood can be
written as
prob(f |N,ω,F) ∝ exp[−NS(µ‖ω)], (9)
where µ ∈ πωF (S) is the unique Gibbs model associated
with the measured f and reference state ω. In other
words, on the Gibbs manifold πωF (S), the Gibbs model µ
representing experimental data is distributed entropically
around ω, µ ∼ Ent(N,ω,F) (see Appendix E).
The second factor on the right hand side of the Bayes
rule (6) is the prior. In principle, it can take any form;
there is no constraint as to the prior knowledge that an
agent may have. But there are good reasons to assume
that it is entropic, too, ω ∼ Ent(α, σ,G), with its peak
at some initial bias σ, and the parameter α character-
ising the agent’s degree of confidence as to this initial
bias. Conceptually, if the only prior knowledge avail-
able is the initial bias σ, then one would demand of a
prior distribution on πσG(S) that it be peaked at and
symmetric around this bias; that it be form-invariant un-
der coarse graining; and that upon composition of sys-
tems, it be non-committal as to any correlations between
the systems. As I discuss in more detail in Appendix
E, these requirements are satisfied by entropic distribu-
tions. In addition, an entropic prior is particularly con-
venient because it is (approximately) conjugate to the
likelihood (9): Upon any measurement that is informa-
tionally complete with respect to the unknown model pa-
rameters, F ⊃ G, Bayesian updating yields a posterior
which (in the Gaussian approximation) is again entropic,
and which differs from the prior only by a change of pa-
rameters, (α, σ)→ (α′, σ′).
Assuming an entropic prior and making the Gaussian
approximation, the Bayes rule yields for F ⊃ G the pos-
terior (F8), and hence
prob(ω|f,N,F ;σ,G) ∝ prob(ω|α+N, ρ,G); (10)
whereas for F ⊂ G, it yields the posterior (F9), and hence
prob(ω|f,N,F ;σ,G) ∝ prob(πσF (ω)|α+N, ρ,F)×
prob(πρ¬G,ρF (ω)|α, ρ,¬G,ρF).(11)
In both cases, the posterior is peaked at the model
ρ ∝ exp
[
α
α+N
lnσ +
N
α+N
lnπσF∩G(µ)
]
. (12)
4This model constitutes the most plausible posterior esti-
mate for ω.
The posterior estimate for ω interpolates between ini-
tial bias and data, and depending on the relative sizes of
α and N , may attribute more weight to one or the other;
this is an example of Bayesian interpolation [21]. In the
extreme case where the prior is sharply peaked while sam-
ple sizes are small, N ≪ α, parameter estimation will be
dominated by the prior, and one is therefore advised to
stick to the initial bias, ρ ≈ σ; while in the opposite case
where the prior is broad and sample sizes are big, N ≫ α,
parameter estimation will be dominated by the likelihood
function, and the best estimate for the model is close to
themaximum likelihood estimate ρ ≈ πσF∩G(µ). Attached
to the estimate are error bars of the order O(1/
√
α+N)
as to those model parameters that have been measured,
and in case F ⊂ G, O(1/√α) as to those that have not.
The above estimation procedure preserves the Gibbs
form, in the following sense. Whenever the prior bias σ is
a generalised Gibbs state, with some level of description
that encloses F∩G, the posterior estimate will retain this
form,
σ ∈ πτH(S) , H ⊃ F ∩ G ⇒ ρ ∈ πτH(S), (13)
for arbitrary values of α and N . In particular, it is ρ ∈
πσF∩G(S). If on the Gibbs manifold πτH(S) the prior bias
has Lagrange parameters λ(σ), and the maximum like-
lihood estimate has Lagrange parameters λ(πσF∩G(µ)),
then the Lagrange parameters of the posterior estimate
(12) are given by linear interpolation,
λ(ρ) =
α
α+N
λ(σ) +
N
α+N
λ(πσF∩G(µ)). (14)
The posterior estimate depends critically on the pa-
rameter α; this parameter has so far been left unspeci-
fied. Provided the experiment reveals a significant devi-
ation from the initial bias (only then does the need arise
to update this bias) and is sufficiently detailed,
χ2(πσF (µ)‖σ) > dimπσF (S)≫ 1, (15)
the optimal value for α can be estimated a posteriori with
the help of the evidence procedure [5]. This procedure
yields an interpolation parameter
α/(α+N) ≈ dimπσF (S)/χ2(πσF (µ)‖σ). (16)
The estimate depends only on the experimental level of
description F , but not on the theoretical level G employed
for the Gibbs model ω.
To illustrate the above framework, I consider the fol-
lowing simple example. A source emits a physical sys-
tem (say, a molecule) which can be in its ground state
or in one of 24 excited states; this spectrum may or
may not be degenerate. Prior theoretical considerations
suggest that the source is thermal, and hence, that the
occupation probabilities {pi}, i = 0 . . . 24, of the en-
ergy levels follow a canonical distribution. There is un-
certainty about the temperature, but according to ini-
tial estimates, it is expected to be around 100K. As re-
gards the system’s state, therefore, the initial bias is a
canonical state σ ∝ exp(−βH), with level of descrip-
tion H = span{1, H}, uniform reference state, and La-
grange parameter β(σ) ≈ 1/100K. Then one performs
N = 12, 000 runs of the experiment, and in each run,
measures the actual occupation of the energy levels. One
finds that the measured distribution of relative frequen-
cies {fi} differs from the expected {pi}. The observed
mean energy,
∑
i fiEi, corresponds to a temperature
110K rather than 100K; and in addition, the shape of
the observed distribution may or may not deviate from
the canonical form. Altogether, one finds that the data
differ from prior expectation by a distance, say,
χ2(πσF (µ)‖σ) ≈ 2N
24∑
i=0
fi ln(fi/pi) ≈ 96. (17)
This deviation is significant enough, and the number of
independent sample means (dimπσF (S) = 24) is suffi-
ciently large, to satisfy both conditions in Eq. (15). So it
is justified to apply the evidence procedure, yielding the
interpolation parameter α/(α +N) ≈ 1/4. If one insists
that the system be modelled by a canonical distribution,
G = H, then the posterior estimate for its inverse tem-
perature is neither the initial 1/100K nor the observed
1/110K, but the interpolation (14), which in this example
yields β(ρ) ≈ 1/107.3K.
IV. COMPARING LEVELS OF DESCRIPTION
Up to this point the level of description of the theo-
retical model, and hence the Gibbs manifold πσG(S) from
which a model was to be selected, have been assumed
to be given a priori. Now they will become themselves
subject to statistical inference.
If a model is to have any explanatory value, its number
of parameters must be strictly smaller than the number
of data points; and so its level of description must be a
proper subspace of the space spanned by the measured
observables, G ⊂ F . In fact, in the spirit of Occam’s razor
one would always prefer simpler models over more com-
plicated ones; yet when this is taken too far, the fit with
the data might deteriorate. Striking the right balance
between simplicity and goodness-of-fit, and determining
thus the optimal level of description, constitutes a non-
trivial inference task. In this Section, I shall discuss how
the Bayesian framework for model selection can guide
the proper choice of the level of description. If presented
with two rival proposals for the level of description, this
framework allows one to evaluate their relative degree of
plausibility in the light of experimental data and prior
expectations.
If a χ2 analysis has revealed that observed devia-
tions from model predictions are statistically significant,
5one might consider moving to a more accurate model
by expanding the level of description, G → H, with
G ⊂ H ⊂ F . Provided the priors on the respective Gibbs
manifolds πσG(S) and πσH(S) are both entropic around the
same initial bias σ, the relative plausibility of the two lev-
els of description is given by the Bayes rule,
prob(G|µ,N,F ;α, σ)
prob(H|µ,N,F ;α, σ) =
prob(G)
prob(H)
prob(µ|N,F ;α, σ,G)
prob(µ|N,F ;α, σ,H) .
(18)
Here F denotes the experimental level of description, N
the sample size, and µ ∈ πσF (S) the Gibbs model associ-
ated with the measured data. The parameter α, which
characterises the degree of confidence as to the initial
bias, is assumed to be identical for both entropic priors;
this assumption is corroborated by the estimate (16),
which does not depend on the level of description em-
ployed for a theoretical model.
The first factor on the right hand side is the ratio
of prior preferences which, to be fair, is often taken to
be of order 1. The second factor can be calculated via
marginalisation,
prob(µ|N,F ;α, σ,G) =∫
πσ
G
(S)
dω prob(µ|N,ω,F) prob(ω|α, σ,G), (19)
and likewise for H. In the Gaussian approximation, the
integrand is given by Eq. (F8); which in the regime N ≫
α, with ρ ≈ πσG(µ), yields
prob(µ|N,F ;α, σ,G) ≈
prob(µ|N, πσG(µ),¬F ,πσG(µ)G) prob(π
σ
G(µ)|α, σ,G).(20)
The ratio is then
prob(µ|N,F ;α, σ,G)
prob(µ|N,F ;α, σ,H) ≈
Ns/2 exp[−NS(πσH(µ)‖πσG(µ))]
αs/2 exp[−αS(πσH(µ)‖πσG(µ))]
,
(21)
where s := (dimH − dimG) denotes the number of ad-
ditional model parameters introduced in the expansion
G → H. The power factors Ns/2 and αs/2 stem from
the normalisation factors of likelihood and prior, respec-
tively, which depend on the dimension of the theoretical
level of description.
Bayesian model selection is thus driven by two main
factors [20, 21]: (i) a ratio of exponentials (of which, in
the regime N ≫ α, the denominator can often be ap-
proximated by 1) favoring the finer-grained model with
better fit; and (ii) the “Occam factor” (N/α)s/2, which
favors the simpler model. It is the trade-off between the
exponentials on the one hand, and the Occam factor on
the other, which typically determines whether or not the
level of description should be expanded. If their product
is much larger than 1, one better stays with the original,
coarser-grained description. In contrast, if it is much less
than 1, one is advised to switch to the finer-grained de-
scription. And if it is of the order 1, the analysis remains
inconclusive, and more data must be collected.
It is important to note that the trade-off decision is
not based on experimental data alone. Rather, it de-
pends also on the initial bias σ and on the parameter α.
The initial bias constitutes one’s starting hypothesis for
the model, prior to performing any measurements, and
is usually based entirely on symmetry and other theoret-
ical considerations; whereas α quantifies the associated
degree of confidence. Both σ and α reflect prior expecta-
tions of the agent who conducts the experiment, and so
in principle, carry aspects which remain irreducibly sub-
jective. In practice, however, rational agents typically
agree on the symmetries of the system under study, and
hence on a unique initial bias to mirror these symmetries.
In fact, in many cases the initial bias is just equidistri-
bution, σ = 1/d, being maximally non-committal in the
absence of any empirical data. The parameter α, on the
other hand, can often be estimated a posteriori with the
help of the evidence procedure.
For large N , the estimate for α becomes independent
of N , and hence the asymptotic behavior of the ratio (21)
is governed entirely by its numerator. Models can then
be selected according to the simple rule of thumb
χ2(πσH(µ)‖πσG(µ))/s


≪ lnN : keep G
∼ lnN : inconclusive
≫ lnN : expand G → H
. (22)
Loosely speaking, whenever the gain in accuracy per ad-
ditional parameter stays below the threshold lnN , one
better sticks to the simpler model. Only when this
threshold is exceeded, is one advised to move to the finer-
grained model with better fit. The threshold is higher
than the threshold for mere statistical significance; if
1 < χ2/s < lnN then the potential accuracy gain is
significant, yet a refinement of the model is still not rec-
ommended.
While Bayesian model selection is a useful quantitative
tool to guide the search for the proper level of descrip-
tion, it does not amount to an algorithm leading uniquely
to “the” ideal level of description. The number of pos-
sible levels of description is infinite, and while the above
framework may help choose between any two of them, it
cannot replace the creative act of coming up with suit-
able candidates [21]. This creative part is beyond the
realm of pure probability, and must involve additional
physical considerations such as the study of symmetries,
conservation laws, and time scales.
V. WOLF’S DIE
To warm up for the interesting quantum case, I shall
illustrate the use of the above mathematical tools in
a famous classical example, Jaynes’ analysis of Wolf’s
die data [23]. Rudolph Wolf (1816–1893), a Swiss as-
tronomer, had performed a number of random exper-
iments, presumably to check the validity of statistical
theory. In one of these experiments a die was tossed
6i fi ∆i
1 0.16230 -0.00437
2 0.17245 +0.00578
3 0.14485 -0.02182
4 0.14205 -0.02462
5 0.18175 +0.01508
6 0.19660 +0.02993
TABLE I. Wolf’s die data: frequency distribution f and its
deviation ∆ from the uniform distribution.
N = 20, 000 times in a way that precluded any system-
atic favoring of any face over any other. The prior expec-
tation was a perfect die, σ = 1/6. However, the observed
relative frequencies {fi} deviated from this expectation;
their measured values are shown in Table I. A quick
analysis reveals that 1/
√
N ∼ 0.007, so several devia-
tions ∆i are outside the typical range. More precisely,
the observed χ2(µ‖σ) ≈ 271 lies in the exponential tail
far beyond its expected value. The probability density for
such a large χ2 is extremely small, pdf(271|5) ∼ 10−56,
pointing to the presence of systematic defects of the die.
To reflect the presumed nature of the die’s imperfec-
tions, one may consider a multitude of different levels of
description. Three specific examples are (i) the simplest
level of description, O = span{1}, corresponding to a
Gibbs manifold πσO(S) that consists of the single state σ
only, where one stubbornly sticks to the initial bias; (ii)
at the opposite extreme, the most accurate level of de-
scription F , where one denies the existence of any simple
explanation for the observed deviations and just intro-
duces as many model parameters as data points; and (iii)
an intermediate level of description G, with two observ-
ables characterising the two most likely imperfections.
These are, according to Jaynes:
• a shift of the center of gravity due to the mass of
ivory excavated from the spots, which being pro-
portional to the number of spots on any side, should
make the “observable”
Gi1 := i− 3.5 (23)
have a nonzero average. Indeed, the measured sam-
ple mean is g1(µ) = 0.0983 6= 0; and
• errors in trying to machine a perfect cube, which
will tend to make one dimension (the last side cut)
slightly different from the other two. It is clear from
the data that Wolf’s die gave a lower frequency for
the faces (3,4); and therefore that the (3-4) dimen-
sion was greater than the (1-6) or (2-5) ones. The
effect of this is that the “observable”
Gi2 :=
{
1 : i = 1, 2, 5, 6
−2 : i = 3, 4 (24)
has a nonzero average. Indeed, g2(µ) = 0.1393 6= 0.
refinement s χ2 χ2/s
O → G 2 262 131
G → F 3 9 3
O → F 5 271 54
TABLE II. Wolf’s die data: number of additional model pa-
rameters and accuracy gain associated with expansions of the
level of description.
If this intermediate level of description turned out to be
the most plausible, it would provide a genuine explana-
tion, rather than merely a description, of the observed
data.
The sample size is large enough to warrant the use
of the rule of thumb (22). Successive refinements O →
G → F of the level of description entail additional model
parameters and accuracy gains as summarised in Table
II. Only the first refinement, O → G, delivers an accu-
racy gain per additional model parameter that exceeds
the threshold lnN ≈ 10. In contrast, the second refine-
ment G → F , albeit delivering a further accuracy gain
that is statistically significant, does not pass this thresh-
old. In case the intermediate level of description G was
not available, and hence there was a choice only between
the “trivial” level of description O and the “perfect fit”
level of description F , the latter would be more plausi-
ble. Sticking stubbornly to the initial bias is the least
plausible of the three options.
If presented with the choice between the three levels
of description outlined above, therefore, statistical anal-
ysis reveals the intermediate, “explanatory” level of de-
scription to be the most plausible. This is not to say,
however, that this is indeed the best level of description:
One might come up with many more alternative propos-
als, which would all have to be compared with each other.
Moreover, even if the above intermediate level of descrip-
tion were confirmed as the winner, statistical analysis
would only yield its relative degree of plausibility, and
would never provide certainty about its being the “true”
level of description. Statistical analysis cannot replace
the creative act of designing levels of description which,
as in the example above, are not only supported by the
data but also well motivated physically.
VI. ISING VS. HEISENBERG
Conceptually, Bayesian model selection for quantum
systems proceeds in the same way as in the classical
case. The quantumness of the problem enters through
the different geometry of the Gibbs manifold. As the
simplest example, I shall study an exchangeable assem-
bly of qubits; there, the geometry to consider is that of
the Bloch sphere.
Initially, nothing is known about the qubits, so the
prior bias σ is uniform. Then measurements on a sam-
7ple of N qubits reveal an average Bloch vector of length
r, with an orientation nˆ that is tilted by a small an-
gle δθ against the z axis. The Bloch vector length
r is considerably larger than zero, so a new model is
called for which is different from the uniform initial bias.
There might be good physical reasons to expect that
the system under consideration is strongly anisotropic
in the z direction, suggesting a level of description I (for
“Ising”) comprising the z component of Pauli spin only,
I = span{1, σz}. In view of the observed tilting angle,
however, there might be controversy about this, and a
rival proposal (“Heisenberg”) might claim that the level
of description should rather include the full Pauli vector,
H = span{1, σx, σy , σz}.
To weigh these alternatives in the light of the data, one
must evaluate
χ2(πσH(µ)‖πσI (µ))/s = NC−1θθ δθ2/2, (25)
where C−1θθ denotes the polar component of the entropy-
induced metric tensor (D9) on the Bloch sphere. For
instance, for N = 20, 000, r = 0.73 and a tilting angle of
1 degree, δθ = 2π/360, it is C−1θθ ≈ 0.678 and χ2/s ≈ 2.1.
Despite a gain in accuracy which is significant, this does
not exceed the threshold lnN ≈ 10, and hence Bayesian
model selection favors the simpler anisotropic model. At
an angle of 2 degrees, χ2/s grows to approximately 8.3;
and this being close to the threshold, the analysis remains
largely inconclusive. Finally, for a tilting angle of 3 de-
grees, the accuracy gain per additional model parameter
attains a value well beyond the threshold, χ2/s ≈ 18.6,
tipping the balance in favor of the more detailed level of
description.
Had one measured a Bloch vector length r = 0.995
instead of 0.73, the balance would have tipped in favor
of the expanded level of description already at a critical
angle of 1 degree, rather than 2 degrees. In general, the
more the measured state approaches purity, the more sen-
sitive the choice of level of description becomes to minor
directional aberrations from the preferred axis.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Outside the macroscopic domain, estimating a Gibbs
state is a nontrivial inference task, due to two compli-
cating factors. First, for lack of a clear hierarchy of time
scales, the proper set of relevant observables might not
be evident a priori but subject to statistical inference.
Second, whenever experimental data are gathered from
a small sample only, the best estimate for the Lagrange
parameters is invariably affected by the experimenter’s
prior bias. Both issues can be tackled with the help of
Bayesian techniques, suitably adapted to the problem at
hand: Bayesian model selection, Bayesian interpolation,
and the evidence procedure.
The results presented in this paper may have ramifi-
cations in a variety of areas. For the study of thermal
properties of a microscopic system (e.g., a tiny probe
taken from a larger system that is presumed to be ther-
mal, or the debris from a single collision experiment)
the framework presented here allows one to decide ra-
tionally between rival theories about the proper set of
relevant observables, and subsequently, to find the best
estimate for the associated Lagrange parameters. For in-
complete quantum-state tomography, the results imply
Bayesian corrections to the conventional maximum en-
tropy scheme; these corrections become important when-
ever sample sizes are small. Moreover, the approach pre-
sented here yields not just estimates for the Lagrange
parameters, but also the attached error bars. Finally, on
a conceptual level, the framework allows for a careful con-
sideration of the thermodynamic limit, and so may shed
new light on the long-standing debate about the gener-
ality of, or possible limitations of, the maximum entropy
paradigm in statistical mechanics [25–29].
I see three avenues for further research. First, it will be
interesting to see how the Bayesian corrections to conven-
tional state reconstruction schemes play out in practice.
A simple example has been discussed (in the context of
the evidence procedure) in Ref. [5]; more examples and
application to real-world experimental data will be the
subject of further work. Second, while the model se-
lection framework used here allows one to assess differ-
ent proposals for the set of relevant observables, it does
not provide a direct route to the optimal such set. Do-
ing so requires an extension of Bayesian reasoning from
the space of states to the space of levels of description,
which will be tackled in future work. Finally, I consider
it worthwhile to study in more detail the asymptotic be-
havior of the schemes presented here, in an effort to un-
derstand better the emergence of orthodox theory in the
macroscopic limit.
Appendix A: Level of description
Any real linear combination of observables is again an
observable. The observables of a physical system thus
constitute a real vector space. This vector space can
be endowed with a positive definite scalar product, the
canonical correlation function with respect to some ref-
erence state σ,
〈X ;Y 〉σ :=
∫ 1
0
dν tr(σνXσ1−νY ); (A1)
so it is in fact a Hilbert space. Within this real Hilbert
space of observables, the (typically small) set of observ-
ables {Ga} which are deemed relevant for the problem
at hand, together with the unit operator, span a proper
subspace
G := span{1, Ga}. (A2)
This subspace is termed the level of description [9].
Levels of description might be related by coarse grain-
ing or complementation. A level of description G is
8“coarser” than another level of description F , G ⊂ F , if
the former is a subspace of the latter. The coarse grain-
ing relation ⊂ induces a partial ordering of the levels of
description, with unique minimal element O := span{1}
and maximal element A, the total Hilbert space of ob-
servables. The level of description G is “complementary”
to F , G = ¬A,σF , if observables from both levels of de-
scription together span the entire space of observables,
and if in the reference state σ the two levels are uncorre-
lated,
G = ¬A,σF :⇔ span{1, Ga, Fb} = A ,
〈δX ; δY 〉σ = 0 ∀X ∈ G, Y ∈ F , (A3)
with δX := X − 〈X〉σ. Complementation reverses the
direction of coarse graining,
G ⊂ F ⇒ ¬A,σF ⊂ ¬A,σG; (A4)
and when applied twice, it returns the original level of
description,
¬A,σ¬A,σG = G. (A5)
The properties of coarse graining and complementation
are reminiscient of those of logical implication and nega-
tion. In this sense, one may say that the space of observ-
ables gives rise to a minimal logical structure.
The intersection and closed hull of two levels of descrip-
tion are denoted by G ∩ F and G ∪ F , respectively. In
line with the logical structure mentioned above, the oper-
ations ∩,∪ share some properties with the Boolean “and”
and “or” operations such as commutativity, associativity
and reversal under complementation; yet the analogy is
not perfect since in contrast to classical Boolean logic,
they violate distributivity. If the levels of description
pertain to two different physical systems A and B then
it is GA ∩ FB = OAB, and
GA ∪ FB = span{1A ⊗ 1B, GAa ⊗ 1B, 1A ⊗ FBb }. (A6)
A further way to concatenate the two constituent levels
of description is by means of the tensor product
GA⊗FB := span{1A⊗1B, GAa ⊗1B, 1A⊗FBb , GAa ⊗FBb }.
(A7)
Appendix B: Relevant part of a state
For an arbitrary state ρ, its relevant part with respect
to a level of description G and reference state σ is the
unique state πσG(ρ) which for all observables in the level
of description yields the same expectation values as ρ,
yet within this constraint, is as close as possible to the
reference state. The distance to the reference state is
measured in terms of the relative entropy [30–33]
S(ρ‖σ) := tr(ρ ln ρ− ρ lnσ). (B1)
The relevant part is thus determined by the minimization
S(πσG(ρ)‖σ) = min
g(ρ′)=g(ρ)
S(ρ′‖σ), (B2)
where I employed g(ρ′) as a shorthand notation for the
set {〈Ga〉ρ′}.
That the relative entropy is the appropriate measure
for the distance between two states, follows from the
quantum Stein lemma [34–36]. According to this lemma,
given a finite sample of size N taken from an i.i.d. source
of states σ, the probability that tomography on this sam-
ple will erroneously reveal some different state ρ,
prob1−ǫ(ρ|N, σ) :=
inf
Γ
{
prob(Γ|σ⊗N )
∣∣ prob(Γ|ρ⊗N ) ≥ 1− ǫ} , (B3)
decreases asymptotically as
prob1−ǫ(ρ|N, σ) ∼ exp[−NS(ρ‖σ)], (B4)
regardless of the specific value of the error parameter ǫ
(0 < ǫ < 1). The Γ featuring in the above definition
are propositions (projection operators) about the sample
which asymptotically, i.e., to within an error probability ǫ
that does not depend on sample size, are compatible with
the sample being in the state ρ⊗N . Taking the infimum
over Γ picks that proposition which is most confined, and
hence discriminates best between σ and ρ. The coefficient
in the exponent is the relative entropy between the two
states, which is thus recognised as the proper measure of
their distinguishability [33].
The relevant part of a state has the generalised Gibbs
form [37]
πσG(ρ) = Z(λ)
−1 exp
[
(lnσ − 〈ln σ〉σ)−
r∑
a=1
λaGa
]
,
(B5)
with the partition function
Z(λ) := tr
{
exp
[
(lnσ − 〈ln σ〉σ)−
r∑
a=1
λaGa
]}
(B6)
ensuring state normalisation, and the Lagrange parame-
ters {λa} adjusted such that g(πσG(ρ)) = g(ρ). Amongst
all states of the above generalised Gibbs form, the rele-
vant part of ρ is that which comes closest to ρ in terms
of relative entropy,
S(ρ‖πσG(ρ)) = min
ρ′
S(ρ‖πσG(ρ′)). (B7)
The reference state is often, but not always, the uniform
distribution; if so, the generalised Gibbs state acquires
the more familiar form
πG(ρ) = Z(λ)
−1 exp
[
−
r∑
a=1
λaGa
]
(B8)
9(with superscript σ omitted) which maximizes the von
Neumann entropy S[ρ] := −tr(ρ ln ρ) under the given
constraints.
Since the relevant part of a state retains complete in-
formation solely about selected degrees of freedom (the
observables contained in the level of description), while
discarding information about the rest, the map πσG : ρ→
πσG(ρ) may be regarded as a coarse graining operation.
Indeed, this operation bears some resemblance to a pro-
jection operator: it is idempotent,
πτG ◦ πσG = πτG (B9)
(even for τ 6= σ); successive coarse grainings with smaller
and smaller levels of description are equivalent to a one-
step coarse graining with the smallest level of description,
G ⊂ F ⇔ πσG ◦ πσF = πσG ; (B10)
and it is covariant under unitary transformations,
πUσU
†
UGU† (UρU
†) = UπσG(ρ)U
†. (B11)
In contrast to a true projection operator, however, the
coarse graining map is in general not linear. In case of
a uniform reference state, the coarse graining map is the
(possibly nonlinear) dual of the Kawasaki-Gunton pro-
jector, a projection superoperator acting on the space of
observables [38].
Appendix C: Gibbs manifold
Let S denote the set of all normalised mixed states
of a given physical system. This set constitutes a dif-
ferentiable manifold of dimension (d2 − 1), where d is
the Hilbert space dimension. In this manifold, states of
the generalised Gibbs form (B5) constitute a submanifold
πσG(S); I call it the Gibbs manifold associated with level
of description G and reference state σ. A point on this
Gibbs manifold, and hence a specific state of generalised
Gibbs form, is a Gibbs model. The Gibbs manifold has
dimension
dim πσG(S) = dim G − 1, (C1)
which equals the number of relevant observables {Ga}
as long as these are linearly independent. Coordinates
on the manifold may be the Lagrange parameters {λa}
or the expectation values {ga}, or any set of (dimG −
1) independent functions thereof. Lagrange parameter
coordinates are related to expectation value coordinates
via
ga = −∂(lnZ)/∂λa. (C2)
Upon infinitesimal variation of the Lagrange parame-
ters, the expectation value of an arbitrary observable A
changes by
d〈A〉 = −
∑
a
〈δGa;A〉dλa, (C3)
with δGa := Ga − ga, and the expectation values and
the canonical correlation function evaluated in the model
with coordinates {λa}. A special case is the variation of
relevant expecation values,
dgb = −
∑
a
dλaCab, (C4)
where the coefficients
Cab := 〈δGa; δGb〉 = ∂
2
∂λa∂λb
lnZ (C5)
form the r × r correlation matrix. As the canonical cor-
relation function has all properties of a positive definite
scalar product in the space of observables, the correlation
matrix is symmetric and positive.
The Gibbs manifold is endowed with a natural Rieman-
nian metric and volume element, induced by the relative
entropy [39, 40]. As one would expect from a proper dis-
tance measure, the relative entropy between two states
is always positive,
S(ρ‖ρ′) ≥ 0, (C6)
with equality if and only if ρ = ρ′; and even though
it is in general not symmetric, S(ρ‖ρ′) 6= S(ρ′‖ρ), it is
approximately so for nearby states:
S(ρ‖ρ+ δρ) ∼ O((δρ)2). (C7)
The relative entropy between two points ω, ω′ on the
same Gibbs manifold is
S(ω‖ω′) =
∑
a
(λ′
a − λa)ga + (lnZ ′ − lnZ); (C8)
which for nearby states is approximately quadratic in the
coordinate differentials,
S(ω‖ω + δω) ≈ (1/2)
∑
ab
Cabδλ
aδλb
≈ (1/2)
∑
ab
(C−1)abδgaδgb. (C9)
The correlation matrix C or its inverse C−1, respectively,
may thus be regarded as a metric tensor on the Gibbs
manifold. Associated with this metric is the volume ele-
ment∫
πσ
G
(S)
dω =
∫ ∏
a
dλa
√
detC =
∫ ∏
a
dga
√
detC−1.
(C10)
Given some coarser level of description H, H ⊂ G, the
Gibbs manifold πσG(S) can be viewed as a fiber bundle,
with the reduced Gibbs manifold πσH(S) as its base, and
the coarse graining map πσH as the bundle projection,
πσH : π
σ
G(S) ∋ ω → ζ ∈ πσH(S). (C11)
The fiber over ζ is the submanifold of Gibbs models sat-
isfying the constraint h(ω) = h(ζ),
πσG ◦ (πσH)−1(ζ) = πσG(S)|h(ζ). (C12)
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It is then possible to factorize volume elements of the
original Gibbs manifold into those of its fiber and base,∫
πσ
G
(S)
dω =
∫
πσ
H
(S)
dζ
∫
πσ
G
(S)|h(ζ)
dω. (C13)
Appendix D: Geometry of the Bloch sphere
Any normalised mixed state of a single qubit can be
written as
ρ = (1/2)(1 + 〈~σ〉ρ · ~σ), (D1)
with ~σ defined as the vector of Pauli matrices, ~σ :=
(σx, σy, σz). The expectation value of the latter is the
Bloch vector; it has the spatial direction nˆ and length r,
〈~σ〉ρ = rnˆ. (D2)
The Pauli matrices being informationally complete, the
above state can always be brought into the Gibbs form
ρ = Z(~λ)−1 exp(−~λ · ~σ), (D3)
with Lagrange parameters
~λ = −(tanh−1 r)nˆ (D4)
and partition function
Z(~λ) = 2 cosh |~λ| = 2/
√
1− r2. (D5)
The relative entropy between two arbitrary qubit
states is
S(ρ‖ρ′) = r tanh−1 r − r tanh−1 r′(nˆ · nˆ′) +
(1/2) ln((1− r2)/(1− r′2)); (D6)
which for nearby states becomes approximately
S(ρ‖ρ′) ≈ (1/2)[C−1rr δr2 + C−1θθ δθ2 + C−1φφ δφ2]. (D7)
Here (r, θ, φ) are the spherical coordinates of the Bloch
vector as defined by
〈σx〉 = r sin θ cosφ , 〈σy〉 = r sin θ sinφ , 〈σz〉 = r cos θ,
(D8)
with r ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, 2π); and C−1 de-
notes the entropy-induced metric tensor (inverse of the
correlation matrix) on the Bloch sphere. In spherical co-
ordinates this metric tensor is diagonal,
C−1 = diag(1/(1− r2), r tanh−1 r, r tanh−1 r sin2 θ),
(D9)
but differs from the ordinary metric diag(1, r2, r2 sin2 θ).
Consequently, the associated volume element
√
detC−1 = r tanh−1 r sin θ/
√
1− r2, (D10)
too, differs from its ordinary counterpart, especially near
the surface of the Bloch sphere:
√
detC−1
r2 sin θ
=
tanh−1 r
r
√
1− r2
{
≈ 1 : r ≪ 1
→∞ : r → 1 . (D11)
Distinguishable quantum states are thus not spread uni-
formly throughout the Bloch sphere as one might expect
classically, but are concentrated on or near its surface.
Appendix E: Entropic distribution
The coordinates of a Gibbs model ω ∈ πσG(S), and
hence its location on the Gibbs manifold, might not be
precisely known but have some probability distribution.
Such a distribution over the Gibbs manifold is entropic,
ω ∼ Ent(α, σ,G), if it has the form
prob(ω|α, σ,G) ∝
{
exp[−αS(ω‖σ)] : ω ∈ πσG(S)
0 : else
,
(E1)
with α > 0 and a factor of proportionality that does
not depend on ω. For large α this is approximately a
Gaussian on πσG(S) of width 1/
√
α around the reference
state σ.
The entropic distribution has a number of important
properties. (i) If ω is entropically distributed then so is
UωU † for any unitary U , with co-transformed reference
state and level of description,
prob(UωU †|α,UσU †, UGU †) = prob(ω|α, σ,G). (E2)
(ii) Coarse graining G → H ⊂ G leaves relative probabil-
ities invariant,
prob(πσH(ω)|α, σ,H) ∝ prob(πσH(ω)|α, σ,G), (E3)
with a factor of proportionality which is independent of
ω. (iii) If the reference state is uncorrelated then the
entropic distribution does not introduce any bias towards
spurious correlations,
prob(ωAB|α, σA ⊗ σB ,GA ⊗FB) ≤
prob(ωA ⊗ ωB|α, σA ⊗ σB,GA ⊗FB), (E4)
where ωA, ωB are the respective reductions of ωAB. And
(iv) for uncorrelated states, the probability factorises,
prob(ωA ⊗ ωB|α, σA ⊗ σB ,GA ⊗FB) ∝
prob(ωA|α, σA,GA) prob(ωB|α, σB ,FB). (E5)
If the reference state σ is uniform then the entropic dis-
tribution is in fact the only probability distribution with
the above four properties, both in the classical [41] and
in the quantum case [42]. In contrast, for arbitrary σ the
uniqueness of the entropic distribution has been shown
in the classical case only [43]; but I conjecture that this
result, too, should carry over to the quantum case.
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Finally, the product of two entropic distributions is
again entropic,
prob(ω|N,µ,G) prob(ω|α, σ,G) ∝
prob(ω|α+N, ρ(µ, σ; t),G), (E6)
provided they are defined over the same Gibbs manifold,
πµG(S) = πσG(S). Here ρ(µ, σ; t) ∈ πσG(S) denotes the
interpolated reference state
ρ(µ, σ; t) ∝ exp[(1− t) lnµ+ t lnσ] (E7)
with t := α/(α+N).
Appendix F: Gaussian approximation and
thermodynamic limit
In many practical applications the states under con-
sideration are all concentrated inside some small region
of state space. It is then often justified to make the
Gaussian approximation, in which relative entropies are
quadratic in the coordinate differentials. In this approx-
imation the relative entropy is symmetric,
S(ρ‖ω) ≈ S(ω‖ρ). (F1)
Furthermore, the normalisation factor of the entropic dis-
tribution becomes∫
πσ
G
(S)
dω exp[−αS(ω‖σ)] ≈ (2π/α)dimπσG(S)/2, (F2)
and thus independent not only of ω but also of σ. As a
consequence, the entropic distribution becomes invariant
under exchange of ω and σ,
prob(ω|α, σ,G) ≈ prob(σ|α, ω,G). (F3)
When the Gibbs manifold πσG(S) is considered as a fiber
bundle (see Appendix C), with some reduced manifold
πσH(S), H ⊂ G, as its base, then in the Gaussian approx-
imation the fiber over ζ ∈ πσH(S) is given by
πσG ◦ (πσH)−1(ζ) ≈ πζ¬G,ζH(S). (F4)
Moreover, for any ω ∈ πσG(S) the four states
πσH(ω) —— ω
| |
σ —— πσ¬G,σH(ω)
(F5)
form a rectangle as shown, with opposite sides having
approximately equal length as measured by the relative
entropy. Together with the (exact) law of Pythagoras [44]
for the relative entropy,
S(ω‖σ) = S(ω‖πσH(ω)) + S(πσH(ω)‖σ), (F6)
these properties imply that the entropic distribution fac-
torises into separate distributions over fiber and base,
prob(ω|α, σ,G) ≈ prob(πσ¬G,σH(ω)|α, σ,¬G,σH)×
prob(πσH(ω)|α, σ,H). (F7)
If a model µ is entropically distributed, µ ∼
Ent(N,ω,F), around a reference state ω which is itself
entropically distributed, ω ∼ Ent(α, σ,G), then in the
Gaussian approximation and for F ⊃ G, the product of
these entropic distributions is
prob(µ|N,ω,F) prob(ω|α, σ,G) ∝ prob(µ|N, ρ,F)×
prob(ω|α+N, ρ,G) prob(ρ|α, σ,F ∩ G), (F8)
with a factor of proportionality that is independent of
both µ and ω, and with ρ ∈ πσF∩G(S) short for the inter-
polated state ρ(πσF∩G(µ), σ; t) as defined in Eq. (E7). In
the case F ⊂ G, the product is approximately
prob(µ|N,ω,F) prob(ω|α, σ,G) ∝
prob(πσF (µ)|N, ρ,F) prob(πσF (ω)|α+N, ρ,F)×
prob(πρ¬G,ρF(ω)|α, ρ,¬G,ρF) prob(ρ|α, σ,F ∩ G).(F9)
In the thermodynamic limit the parameter N (but not
the parameter α) approaches infinity, N → ∞. The in-
terpolation parameter t then approaches zero, t→ 0, and
as a consequence, ρ → πσF∩G(µ). In this limit the above
product approaches asymptotically, for F ⊃ G,
prob(µ|N,ω,F) prob(ω|α, σ,G) ∼ δ¬F,σG(µ− ρ)×
δG(ω − ρ) prob(ρ|α, σ,F ∩ G), (F10)
where δ¬F,σG and δG are multi-dimensional delta func-
tions on the Gibbs manifolds πρ¬F,σG(S) and π
ρ
G(S), re-
spectively; and for F ⊂ G,
prob(µ|N,ω,F) prob(ω|α, σ,G) ∼ δF (πσF (ω)− ρ)×
prob(πρ¬G,ρF (ω)|α, ρ,¬G,ρF) prob(ρ|α, σ,F ∩ G). (F11)
Appendix G: Link to thermodynamics
Much of conventional thermodynamics amounts to ex-
ploring the differential geometry of the Gibbs manifold,
and in particular, transforming its coordinates to that
set of variables which is best suited for the problem at
hand. Contained in this set is usually the thermodynamic
entropy, which for a Gibbs model ω ∈ πσG(S) is defined
as
S := −S(ω‖σ)− 〈ln σ〉σ. (G1)
(I employ natural units with kB = 1.) If the reference
state is uniform, this reduces to the more familiar ex-
pression S = −〈lnω〉ω. The thermodynamic entropy is
related to the Lagrange parameters and expectation val-
ues via
S = lnZ +
∑
a
λaga, (G2)
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with differential
dS =
∑
a
λadga. (G3)
In addition to the Lagrange parameters {λa}, the par-
tition function Z might depend on further parameters
{ξb}; these might be, say, parameters that determine the
choice of Hilbert space (e.g., a fixed spatial volume or
particle number) or control parameters on which the op-
erators {Ga} depend (e.g., an external field). Associated
with these parameters {ξb} are then further variables
κb := ∂(lnZ)/∂ξ
b. (G4)
Taking these into account, the entropy differential reads
dS =
∑
a
λadga +
∑
b
κbdξ
b. (G5)
Being the only assured constant of the motion, the
internal energy U features always as a variable in con-
ventional thermodynamics, with the inverse temperature
β as its conjugate. Depending on whether the energy is
given on average or as a sharp constraint, the pair (U, β)
may be of the type (g, λ) (“canonical ensemble”) or (ξ, κ)
(“microcanonical ensemble”), respectively. In both cases,
defining the temperature
T := 1/β (G6)
and new variables
wa := −λa/β , Xb := −κb/β, (G7)
one obtains from Eq. (G5) the first law of thermodynam-
ics,
dU = TdS︸︷︷︸
δQ
+
∑
a
wadga +
∑
b
Xbdξ
b
︸ ︷︷ ︸
δW
. (G8)
Here the differential δQ denotes heat, and δW denotes
work. Some common choices for the pairs (g, w) and
(ξ,X) are listed in Table III.
The internal energy U is an example of a thermody-
namic potential. Other important examples are the free
energy
F := U − TS (G9)
and the grand potential
A := U − TS −
∑
a
waga, (G10)
with respective differentials
dF = −SdT +
∑
a
wadga +
∑
b
Xbdξ
b (G11)
(g,w) (ξ,X) names
(~p,~v) momentum, velocity
(~L, ~ω) angular momentum, angular velocity
(N, µ) (N, µ) particle number, chemical potential
( ~M, ~B) ( ~B,− ~M) magnetic field, magnetization
(~P , ~E) ( ~E,−~P ) electric field, electric polarization
(V,−p) volume, pressure
TABLE III. Common examples of thermodynamic variables.
In cases where two alternative pairings are given, the proper
choice depends on the specific situation: For instance, ( ~M, ~B)
should be used if the magnetization is an (approximate) con-
stant of the motion and given on average, whereas ( ~B,− ~M)
should be employed if the magnetic field is an external control
parameter for the Hamiltonian.
and
dA = −SdT −
∑
a
gadw
a +
∑
b
Xbdξ
b. (G12)
The latter implies, e.g., S = −(∂A/∂T )w,ξ, where the
subscripts denote the variables to be kept fixed when
taking the partial derivative.
The grand potential is directly linked to the partition
function,
A(T,wa, ξb) = −T lnZ(T,wa, ξb), (G13)
which in turn can be calculated microscopically. A key
part of statistical mechanics is determining the partition
function and hence the grand potential, and subsequently
relating the latter, via suitable coordinate transforma-
tions on the Gibbs manifold, to the other thermodynamic
variables of interest.
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